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Institute of Business and Management

National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan

Course ID

IBM6047

Course Name

Game Theory

Credit hours

3

Instructor

Jin-Li Hu

Prerequisites

Calculus

Major Textbook

Watson, J. (2002), Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

References

1.       Mas-Colell, A., M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2.       Friedman, J.W. (1991), Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford: Oxford University.

3.       Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

4.       Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press.

5.       Mas-Colell, A., M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

6.       Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1993), Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Objective of the Course

Game Theory has become the fundamental tool for analysis in management science, economics, as well as many other social sciences.?This course teaches graduate students how to correctly apply game theory to solve interesting problems.

Course outlines

1.            Introduction

2.            The Normal Form

3.            Strategies

4.            The Extensive Form

5.            Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Utility

6.            Dominance and Best Response

7.            Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance

8.            Location and Partnership

9.            Congruous Strategies and Nash Equilibrium

10.        Oligopoly, Tariffs, and Crime and Punishment

11.        Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

12.        Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies

13.        Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings

14.        Details of the Extensive Form

15.        Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection

16.        Topics in Industrial Organization

17.        Parlor Games

18.        Bargaining Problems

19.        Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games

20.        Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium

21.        Investment, Hold Up, and Ownership

22.        Repeated Game and Reputation

23.        Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill

24.        Random Events and Incomplete Information

25.        Risk and Incentives in Contracting

26.        Bayesain Nash and Rationalizability

27.        Trade with Incomplete Information

28.        Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

29.        Job-Market Singling and Reputation

Course requirements

Class attendance (30%), homework (30%), oral presentation (20%), term paper (20%)

Correspondence

E-mail: jinlihu@yahoo.com

URL: http://jinlihu.tripod.com